13 janvier 2016 : "Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?"

Abstract

From Leibniz to Krauss philosophers and scientists have raised the question as to why there is something rather than nothing (henceforth, the Question). Why-questions request a type of explanation and this is often thought to include a deductive component. With classical logic in the background only trivial answers are forthcoming. With free logics in the background, be they of the negative, positive or neutral variety, only question-begging answers are to be expected. The same conclusion is reached for the modal version of the Question, namely ‘Why is there something contingent rather than nothing contingent?’. I also look skeptically at the prospects of giving causal-counterfactual or probabilistic answers to the Question. The meta-question, viz. the question as to whether or not we should continue to ask the Question, is tentatively answered in the negative.