DP2018

2018/18
Matthias Weber, Jonas Striaukas, Martin Schumacher and Harald Binder. Network constrained covariate coefficient and connection sign estimation.

2018/17
Justina Klimaviciute, Pierre Pestieau and Jérôme Schoenmaeckers. Altruism and long-term care insurance.

2018/16
Zhengyuan Gao. Uncertainty in economic growth and inequality.

2018/15
Zhengyuan Gao. An imaginary realistic market.

2018/14
Thomas Hacardiaux and Jean-Sébastien Tancrez. Assessing the benefits of horizontal cooperation using a location-inventory model

2018/13
Simon Schopohl. Communication games with optional verification

2018/12
Pierre Dehez and Victor Ginsburgh. Approval voting and Shapley ranking

2018/11
Justina Klimaviciute, Pierre Pestieau and Jérôme Schoenmaeckers. Long-term care insurance with family altruism: Theory and empirics.

2018/10
Geovani Grapiglia and Yurii Nesterov. Accelerated regularized Newton methods for minimizing composite convex functions.

2018/09
Luc Bauwens and Edoardo Otranto. Nonlinearities and regimes in conditional correlations with different dynamics.

2018/08
Justina Klimaviciute, Harun Onder and Pierre Pestieau. The inherited inequality: How demographic aging and pension reforms can change the intergenerational transmission of wealth.

2018/07
Antonis Demos and Dimitra Kyriakopoulou. Finite sample theory and bias correction of maximum likelihood estimators in the EGARCH model.

2018/06
Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere. An age-differentiated tax on bequests.

2018/05
Yurii Nesterov. Implementable tensor methods in unconstrained convex optimization.

2018/04
Jean Hindriks and Valerio Serse. Heterogeneity in the tax pass-through to spirit retail prices: Evidence from Belgium.

2018/03
Jacques H. Drèze. Subjective expected utility with state-dependent but action/observation-independent preferences.

2018/02
Justin Delloye, Dominique Peeters and Joe Tharakan. Equilibrium selection and stability in dynamic core-periphery models with heterogeneous preferences.

2018/01
Yurii Nesterov. Soft clustering by convex electoral model.