Title: Revisiting European day-ahead electricity market auctions: MIP models and algorithms 
Date and venue: 15 March at 2PM, in room DOYE 22, Doyens building, 2nd floor.
Abstract: In Europe, orders are submitted to power exchanges to sell or buy substantially large amounts of electricity for the next day. The orders include so-called non-convexities rendering the underlying microeconomic optimization problem `non-convex', departing from more classical assumptions in microeconomic theory. Most of the power exchanges are integrated at a European level under the Price Coupling of Region project. Uniform prices are computed, in the sense that every market participant of a same market segment (location and hour of the day) will pay or receive the same electricity price and no other transfers or payments are considered. This is done at the expense of having some bids "paradoxically rejected" in the market outcome, as for the computed market prices, some bids propose a price which is "good enough" but are yet rejected. It is also at the expense of welfare optimality, as most of the time, no welfare optimal solution can be supported by uniform prices such that no financial losses are incurred. The present thesis proposes mixed integer programming models and algorithms for such non-convex uniform price auctions. In particular, a new bidding product is proposed which generalizes both block orders used in the Central Western Europe Region (France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, etc) or Nord Pool (coupling Northern countries), and, mutatis mutandis, complex orders with a minimum income condition as used in Spain and Portugal.